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Taxpayers’ Response to Tax Rate Changes:
A Canadian Panel Study*
Robert Gagné†, Jean-François Nadeau‡, François Vaillancourt§
Résumé / Abstract
Les contribuables sont en mesure de réagir aux changements dans les taux
marginaux d'impôt sur le revenu de diverses manières. Ces réactions sont de deux
ordres : changement de comportement (offre de travail, types de revenu, épargne,
etc.) ou changement dans la manière de déclarer les revenus (report, évasion
fiscale, etc.). Par conséquent, il est possible qu'un changement dans les taux
d'impôt entraîne un changement non-proportionnel de l'impôt payé. Cette étude
propose une méthodologie permettant l'estimation des élasticités du revenu et du
nombre de contribuables par rapport aux taux d'impôt. Trois classes de revenus
sont retenues pour l'analyse : revenus moyens (50 000 $ – 100 000 $), revenus
élevés (100 000 $ – 150 000 $) et revenus très élevés (150 000 $ et plus). La
méthodologie proposée est appliquée à un panel de données provinciales au
Canada au cours de la période 1972-1996. Des résultats spécifiques sont présentés
pour trois sous-périodes (1972-1976, 1977-1987 et 1988-1996). Ces sous-périodes
correspondent aux différents régimes fiscaux qu'a connus le Canada entre 1972 et
1996. Les résultats indiquent des réactions significatives des contribuables à
revenus élevés et très élevés durant la période 1988-1996. Les résultats obtenus du
modèle portant sur le nombre de contribuables indiquent également qu'une part
importante de la réaction s'explique par la migration des contribuables entre les
classes de revenu.
Taxpayers may respond to changes in income tax rates in several manners.
One way to classify them is to distinguish between behavioural changes (changes
in labour supply, changes in the weights of the different types of labour income,
changes in saving behaviour, etc.) and income reporting changes (timing,
evasion, ...). Consequently, there might not be a perfectly proportional
relationship between tax rate changes and tax revenues. This paper presents a
methodology for the estimation of 1)income and 2)number of taxpayer elasticities
with respect to marginal income tax rates. The model considers shares of total
income and number of taxpayer for three income classes: medium ($50,000-
$100,000), high ($100,000-$150,000) and highest ($150,000 and more) for a
panel of Canadian provinces over the 1972-1996 period and for three sub-periods
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(1972-1976, 1977-1987, 1988-1996). The results show significant responses to tax
rate changes from taxpayers in the high and highest income classes at the end of
the period under study (1988-1996). Results obtained from the number of
taxpayer share model also indicate that a significant part of the response of
taxpayers to tax rate changes is explained by taxpayers moving to lower income
classes.
Mots Clés : Taux d'impôt, impôt sur le revenu, données de panel
Keywords: Tax rates, income elasticity, panel data
11. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present provincial panel estimates of income and number of
taxpayers tax rate elasticities for Canada over the 1972-1996 period in total and broken down into
three sub-periods reflecting different tax regimes. Our empirical model considers shares of total
income and number of taxpayer for three income classes expressed in $ of 1995: medium
($50,000-$100,000), high ($100,000-$150,000) and highest ($150,000 and more) for a panel of
Canadian provinces over the 1972-1996 period and for each tax regimes (1972-1976, 1977-1987,
1988-1996). This approach is of interest for two reasons. First, it uses aggregate provincial data
to examine the impact of tax rates: such a methodology is rarely used since authors of US studies
have access to individual income taxfillers data. But in most countries, such data is not available
while tabular data are. Second, Canada experienced particularly high marginal rates during that
period due to the use by both the federal government and provincial ones of surtaxes to reduce
their deficits. As of 2000, the federal government and most provincial jurisdictions now enjoy
budget surpluses and the question on how to use these surpluses arises. It is often framed as
follows: Should governments restore (at least partially) the former levels of spending in, notably,
social programs such as healthcare and public education, reduce their debts or cut taxes,
particularly income taxes which are amongst the highest as a share of GDP in industrialised
countries? This question implicitly assumes that there is a trade-off between these apparently
divergent objectives and in particular that tax reduction will reduce government revenues. In this
paper, using an original methodology based on aggregate panel data, we show that this trade-off
might not exist in the case of personal income tax.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature and the
Canadian personal income tax system. Section 3 presents the empirical model and data. Section 4
discusses the regression results. It is shown that the income of high-income individuals is
sensitive to a point such that government revenues would have increased following a reduction of
the high-income taxpayers marginal tax rate. The results also show that a significant part of the
taxpayer response takes the form of taxpayers moving out of their income class. In section 5, we
discuss the implications of our results in terms of fiscal policy and conclude.
2. A Brief Review of the Literature and of the Canadian Personal Income Tax System
a) Literature
Without any response from the taxpayers to a change in marginal income tax rates, the level of
income reported for tax purpose is not affected and therefore tax revenues move in the same
direction and in proportion to the tax rate change. However, a change in marginal tax rates may
alter the behaviour of taxpayers for many reasons that , in turn, will affect reported income and
tax revenues. For instance, taxpayers may respond to an increase in marginal tax rates by
reducing their work effort. The existence of this type of response has received little support from
the labour supply literature (see Pencavel, 1986; MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch, 1990; Triest,
1990, 1992). For Feldstein (1995), three reasons explain this lack of support: 1) the ignorance of
the income-leisure trade-off resulting from the progressivity of the tax schedule and the existence
2of other household income; 2) above mentioned studies were concerned with the labour supply of
men, while it has been shown that women participation rate and hours are much more sensitive to
net wages and tax rates than those of men (see, for instance, Rosen, 1976; Hausman, 1985; Mroz,
1987; Heckman, 1993); 3) most studies are also mainly concerned with labour force participation
and hours worked, while individuals may in the short run reduce work effort but in the long run
change their occupation or even move to a friendlier land (fiscally speaking). It has also been
argued by Feldstein and Feenberg (1996) that an increase of marginal income tax rates may
induce taxpayers to work more to offset the reduction of their disposable income. However, this
argument may not be valid in the case of high-income individuals.
Beside labour supply effects, changes in marginal tax rates may affect reported income since
taxpayers can affect the nature of their compensation package by replacing wages by fringe
benefits (private insurance, car, corporate dining rooms, etc.). Finally, changes in marginal tax
rates may induce individuals to modify their saving behaviour, seek more tax shelters (tax
avoidance) and even engage in tax evasion. Once again, these types of behaviour are more likely
for high-income individuals.
Broadly speaking, two approaches have been used to measure the total response of taxpayers to
changes in marginal income tax rates. Lindsey (1987) used a repeated cross section of tax returns
from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to analyse the response of taxpayers to changes in
U.S. personal income tax rates following the 1981 tax reform. Lindsey performed a comparison
of actual taxable income to a baseline taxable income that would have been observed in the
absence of tax changes. His results indicate that between one-sixth and one-fourth of the revenue
losses that would have been attributable to the tax rate reductions were recouped by changes in
taxpayer behaviour.
The other approach is based on the analysis of a panel of individual tax returns observed before
and after a tax reform. This line of research has been initiated by Feldstein (1995) who took
advantage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and computed the change in taxable income between
1985 and 1988 of 4000 individual taxpayers and then derived differences-in-differences elasticity
estimates of taxable income with respect to net-of-tax rates for three income groups: medium,
high and highest. He obtained quite large estimates (between 1 and 3). The work of Feldstein has
been criticised by Auten and Carroll (1994, 1995): they note in particular the relatively few high
income taxpayers in its sample. Elasticity estimates by Auten and Carroll are more conservatives
(around 0.66). More recently, Auten and Carroll (1999) obtained a taxable income elasticity
estimate of around 0.60 by giving a greater weight to lower-income taxpayers. Saez (1999), also
using a panel of individual tax returns concluded that taxpayers were responding to marginal tax
rate changes but not at the levels computed by Feldstein or even Auten and Carroll. Saez’s study
is not associated with a particular tax reform but rather to tax changes attributable to the "bracket
creep"1.
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 Real changes in marginal tax rates due to inflation and to the fact that, between 1979 and 1981, the U.S. tax rate
schedule was fixed in nominal terms.
3A common feature of the above approaches is that the response to changes in tax rates is
estimated by comparing tax returns of the same individuals (or identical individuals) over a
relatively short period of time. These panels of individuals taxpayers are used because
behavioural response to tax changes may be properly isolated from other unobservable non-tax
effects affecting the income distribution such as an increasing overall level of education or
technological change. Except for Saez (1999), tax reforms occurred during the periods under
study.
b) Key features of the Canadian income tax system
All provinces use a common definition of income, as a result of either formal tax collection
agreements by which 9/10 provinces have their income tax collected by the federal government
(as a % of the federal tax payable or tax on tax) while the 10th (Quebec) collects it’s income tax
itself but out of convenience uses a definition of income very similar to the federal one (we say
similar rather than identical because slight divergences emerge from time to time but they create
less than a 1% difference on average).
There was a major change implemented in the fiscal regime in 1972, which explains our choice
of that year as the first year of our data with the definition of income significantly widened to
implement the recommendations of the Carter Commission (inclusion of ½ the capital gains, of
unemployment insurance, etc.). Income tax rates were fairly stable from 1972-1976.
There was a change in the funding of federal transfers to the provinces in the areas of health and
post secondary-education in 1977 with cash transfers being replaced in part by a withdrawal from
the personal income tax field by the federal government and a concomitant occupation by the
provinces through higher tax rates. As a result, provincial tax rates play a more important role
from then on. From 1977 to 1987, rates first increase then decrease and were lower at the end
than at the beginning.
There was a second major change in the fiscal regime in 1988. Following the UK and the USA,
Canada broadened the definition of taxable income in part by abolishing various tax expenditures
(e.g. interest income) and, at the federal level, by lowering the number of tax brackets to 3 and
lowering the tax rates. Furthermore, a number of exemptions and deductions were transformed
into tax credits computed at the lowest tax rate regardless of income. This last period was
characterised by a drop in income tax rates from 1987 to 1988 and then by a slow but steady
increase of these rates for the high ($100000-$150000) and highest ($150000 and more) income
classes. The three sub-periods used in our analysis reflect these changes.
We summarise the tax system in Figures 1 and 2. The first one presents the average (Canadian)
marginal income tax rate for the three income groups considered while the second presents the
variation in the 10 provincial rates for each income group.
(Figures 1 and 2 here)
43. Empirical Model, Data and Variables
In this paper, we propose an original methodology based on Canadian panel aggregate data to
estimate taxpayers response to changes in marginal income tax rates by income class. Because
two levels of government (federal and provincial) obtain revenues from income taxes, the
Canadian tax system offers an interesting amount of tax diversity: income tax schedules are
specific to each province while the definition of income is the same everywhere. This feature
allows for the comparison of income at a specific point in time between two tax schedules.
Second, Revenue Canada reports on a yearly basis aggregate data on each component of income
by province and by income class. Third, in addition to income and its components, Revenue
Canada also reports the number of taxpayers within each income class. This information may be
used to evaluate whether responsive taxpayers move within their income class or to another
income class.
Relatively to individual data, aggregate data can give a more complete picture of the effects of a
tax change on government revenues. The results are not affected by the small number of high or
highest income taxpayers usually found in most samples based on individual taxpayer data. In
addition, results from aggregate data may be used to infer all types of effects (increasing or
decreasing tax rates) while previous studies have limited the analysis to one type of effects (e.g.
tax reduction in the case of Lindsey, 1987, Feldstein, 1995, Auten and Carroll, 1994, 1995, 1999
and tax increase in the case of Saez, 1999). In fact, in our data set, marginal income tax rates
move in both directions.
Of course, several factors beside marginal income tax rates may explain differences in aggregate
income or number of taxpayers differential in a given income class between two provinces or
between two time periods within the same province. Failure to control for this unobserved
heterogeneity may lead to false conclusions regarding taxpayers’ response to tax rate changes if
this heterogeneity is closely related to tax rates. Our empirical model uses three different ways to
eliminate a significant proportion of this unobserved heterogeneity. First, all factors which affect
income regardless of income class are eliminated by using income shares rather than income
levels for a given income class. It is important to emphasise that income shares can be computed
from aggregate data but not from individual tax returns data. Also, additional province-specific
factors which affect income levels regardless of time are eliminated with province-specific fixed
effects. Finally, effects which are affecting income levels over time regardless of the province are
eliminated by time-specific fixed effects. Remaining time- and province-specific effects (beside
tax rates) which affect total income levels are controlled for by observable time and province
specific variables such as the overall macroeconomic conditions and the underlying income
distribution. The same approach is also used for the estimation of the number of taxpayers by
income class.
i) Empirical Model
The existing literature on the analysis of taxpayer response to tax rate changes mainly provides
taxable income elasticity estimates with respect to marginal tax rates. This paper focuses instead
5on the relationship between total income (or number of taxpayers) and tax rates. In Canada,
taxable income is defined as total income minus exemptions and deductions such as pension fund
contributions, union dues, child care expenses, capital gain deductions, etc. We assume that when
marginal tax rate changes, taxpayers respond solely through total income from which taxable
income may be easily calculated using the applicable legal deductions. Therefore, our results
should be interpreted as lower bound effects since they are not considering the response of
taxpayers in terms of deductions such as capital gains or investments in a pension fund.
Consider now the following total income (or, alternatively, number of taxpayers) functions:
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where jity  is the total income for income class j, in province i at time t; itP  and itT  are,
respectively, provincial and time dummy variables; itZ  is a vector of province and time specific
variables reflecting the general economic conditions and the underlying income distribution in
the economy; jitτ  is the marginal tax rate of income class j; ),,,,,( jjjZjtjijoj τττ ααααααα =  is a
vector of parameters; and jitu  is a disturbance. The functional form in (1) only allows for strictly
positive predictions of total income (or number of taxpayers). The specification takes into
account of the potential non-linear response to tax rate changes by including the marginal income
tax rate of the income class but also its square.
The total income (or number of taxpayers) share of income-class j is given by
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Since shares add-up to one, the system of equations defined by (1) and (2) cannot be estimated
without some normalisation. Arbitrarily choosing the lowest income class for normalisation and
taking the logarithm we get, using (1) and (2), the following empirical equations:
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where 1it
j
it
j
it uu −=µ . Also, given the nature of the data (panel), it is assumed that the disturbance
j
itµ  follows an AR(1) process, that is jitjitjjit ωµρµ += −1  where jitω  is an i.i.d. disturbance with
Var( jitω )= 2jσ and Cov( kitjit ,ωω )= jkσ for all kj ≠ .
The system of equations defines by (3) is first estimated by the iterative version of the seemingly
unrelated regression method (SURE).2 Then, the jρ  are computed from the empirical residuals
of the regression. Finally, using the estimated values of the jρ , the Prais-Winsten transformation
is applied to all the variables in the model and the transformed model is estimated again by
iterative SURE.
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6Because marginal tax rates are specific to each income class, their associated parameters are
identified for all classes as it is showed by equation 3. Consequently it is possible to compute for
each income class the total income and number of taxpayer elasticities with respect to marginal
tax rates. For the income class j, these elasticities are computed (omitting subscripts i and t) as
22 )( jjjjj
,y ταταε ττττ += . (4)
The response of a taxpayer to a personal income tax rate change may take two forms: income
change within the same income class or income change such that the taxpayer moves to an other
income class. Because aggregate data allow us to estimate both total income and number of
taxpayers elasticities with respect to marginal income tax rates, we are able to identify the form
of the response. Defining jitn  as the number of taxpayers in j, i, t and jity  as the average (total)
income per taxpayer in the same income class, province and time period, we can write
,yny jit
j
it
j
it =
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Hence, it is straightforward to define the total income elasticity with respect to the marginal tax
rate jitτ  as
,
j
,y
j
,n
j
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where j
,n τε and 
j
,y τε are, respectively, the number of taxpayers and average income elasticities with
respect to the marginal tax rate in income class j (we omit province and time subscripts for
simplicity). Our model allow us to estimate both total income and number of taxpayer elasticities.
The average income elasticities within an income class may then be computed using equation (6).
ii) Data and Variables
Income and number of taxpayers variables are taken from Tax Statistics on Individuals, various
editions, published annually by Revenue Canada.3 Our study considers data at the provincial level
(10 provinces) over the 1972 to 1996 period. These data are reported by income class defined in
nominal terms. For the empirical analysis, we consider three income classes as they were defined
in 1995: medium ($50,000 to $100,000), high ($100,000 to $150,000) and highest (more than
$150,000). The low income class ($0 to $50,000) is not considered because it is unlikely that
taxpayers in this income class respond or can respond to marginal tax rate changes. For the years
before 1995 and in 1996, the income classes as they were defined in 1995 have been deflated
using the implicit GDP price index. Of course fiscal data are not published according to income
classes expressed in 1995 dollars. For instance, in 1980, the income class corresponding to the
medium income class (1995 dollars) was $25,145 to $50,288. The nearest income class for which
data were available in 1980 was $25,000 to $50,000. These approximation errors are similar
across all provinces at a specific point in time and therefore compensated for by the inclusion of
the time-specific fixed effects in the model.
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7The province and time-specific effects are estimated using province and time-specific dummy
variables ( itP  and itT ). For the estimation, the province of Quebec in 1972 is the omitted
category. Since the parameters 1α are not identified in the model (except for 1τα  and 1ττα ), the
results associated with a particular province-specific effect is a deviation between income class j
and income class 1 (medium) beyond any deviation between the same income classes in Quebec.
The same interpretation apply for the time-specific effect, that is deviation beyond any deviation
in 1972.
The vector of variables reflecting the general economic conditions of a province in a particular
year ( itZ ) includes the growth rate of the real provincial GDP, the growth rate of the provincial
unemployment rate and the provincial Gini coefficient. All three variables were obtained from
Statistics Canada. The Gini coefficient is included in the model in order to take into account of
the underlying income distribution in the economy. It is not computed with tax data but from a
survey conducted on a regular basis by Statistics Canada. Again here, as for the dummy
variables, the parameters associated with these variables are not identified for the medium
income class. Parameters associated with those variables for the high and highest income classes
are therefore differential effects relatively to the medium income class.
The marginal income tax rates associated with each income class are taken from the Finances of
the Nation (various issues) published by the Canadian Tax Foundation. These tax rates combine
the federal and provincial rates. They differ from the statutory tax rate schedule since they
represent the effective marginal tax rates for a given income level for a single individual, taking
into account the personal deduction/credit and the relevant surtaxes, if any. In order to assign to
each income class its relevant marginal tax rate, we computed the average taxable income per
taxpayer for a given class and then chose the appropriate marginal tax rate for this level of
taxable income in the Finances of the Nation. Therefore, our tax rates represent the marginal tax
rate of the average taxpayer in a given income class.
4. Empirical Results
i) General Results
Tables 1 and 2 report the parameter estimates of respectively the income and number of taxpayer
share models. In each case, two different specifications are considered. The first two columns of
the tables present estimates obtained from the specification defined by equation (3). In this
specification, the parameters associated with the marginal tax rates ( jτα  and jττα ) are the same
over the entire period under study. Alternatively, columns 3 and 4 of each table present estimates
obtained with a specification where the parameters associated with the marginal tax rates are
specific to each fiscal regime observed during the studied period (1972-1977, 1978-1987, 1988-
1996). For both models (income and number of taxpayers), a likelihood ratio (LR) test shows that
8the regime-specific parameter specifications dominate the no regime-specific parameter
specifications.4
(Tables 1 and 2 here)
For all models and specifications considered, most of the province-specific effects are statistically
significant in both the high and highest income classes. These effects are not reported for space
reasons but may be obtained from the authors on request. The presence of significant province-
specific effects is an indication that using shares rather than levels did not remove all the
unobserved heterogeneity. On the other hand, the results on the time-specific effects depend on
the specification considered. Without regime-specific parameters associated with the marginal tax
rates, most time-specific effects are statistically significant in both income and number of
taxpayer models in both high and highest income classes. When regime-specific parameters are
introduced in the specification, only a few time-specific effects are still statistically significant
(again here, results associated with time-specific effects are not reported but may be obtained
upon request). Therefore, it seems that with a proper specification with regard to marginal tax
rates, nearly all unobserved heterogeneity related to time has been removed from the data in all
income classes. Because the definition of income is the same in a particular point in time in all
provinces, time related heterogeneity was expected to be a bigger problem than heterogeneity
related to provincial specificity. The quasi-absence of residual time-related heterogeneity gives a
strong indication that, for instance, all changes in income and income class definitions have been
properly accounted for by the model.
The results associated with macroeconomic conditions and income distribution are, when
statistically significant, intuitively consistent. The parameter of GDP growth is not significant in
any model (income or number of taxpayers), specification (regime-specific effects or not) and
income class (high or highest). Still, GDP growth may induce some response from the taxpayers,
but this response is the same in all income classes. The effect of unemployment rate growth is
statistically significant only for the highest income class. In that case, the parameter associated
with unemployment growth is positive which indicate that high income taxpayers are less
affected than other taxpayers by the labour market conditions. Finally, the parameter associated
with the Gini coefficient is statistically significant and positive in 3 out of 4 highest income class
equations. Therefore, it seems that highest income taxpayers are more sensitive to the overall
income distribution than other taxpayers.
The results associated with the marginal tax rates are difficult to interpret because the
specifications include the non-linear term 2)( jτ . Without regime-specific parameters associated
with marginal tax rates, the parameters associated with the marginal tax rates are all negative and
significant for all income classes and in all models considered (income and number of taxpayers).
Also, the parameters associated with the square of the marginal tax rates are in all cases positive
and significant. Therefore, for the three income classes considered, our results indicate a
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 The LR test statistics are, respectively, 23.44 for the income model and 25.75 for the number of taxpayer model. In
both cases, it is greater than the critical value of a 2χ with 12 degrees of freedom at a 5% confidence level  (21.03).
9significant response of taxpayers for both income level and number of taxpayers. Higher tax rates
reduce income and number of taxpayer shares in a given income classes. Furthermore, it seems
that the shape of the response to tax rate changes is not linear.
With regime-specific parameters associated with marginal tax rates the results are more mixed
and even harder to interpret. When statistically significant, the parameters associated with the
marginal tax rates are of the expected sign. However, very few of them are statistically
significant. It seems that the clear effects obtained without the regime-specific specifications have
been dissipated through all fiscal regimes. Therefore, in order to obtain a more accurate picture of
the responses to tax rate changes, we now turn to the elasticity estimates.
ii) Elasticity Estimates
This section presents estimates of the elasticities of both income and number of taxpayers with
respect to marginal tax rates. Elasticities are computed using equation (4) and using the average
marginal tax rates of each fiscal regime. In Tables 3 and 4 we present income and number of
taxpayer elasticity estimates computed without regime-specific parameters. In both cases, results
are reported for each fiscal regime and income class.5 Tables 5 and 6 report the corresponding
elasticities computed with regime-specific parameters.
(Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 here)
It should be noted first that significant responses are observed mostly during the last fiscal regime
(1988-1996). During the first two fiscal regimes, some significant responses are observed mainly
for the high income class when the elasticities are computed with regime-specific parameters. In
that case, both income and number of taxpayer elasticities are negative (but larger than –1) and of
approximately the same magnitude (between –0.50 and –0.75). We do find other significant
effects in the earlier fiscal regimes, but without any consistent pattern.
The most interesting results are obtained during the last fiscal regime. Over this time period,
income elasticities with respect to tax rates are statistically significant regardless of the
specification and income class. In both specifications considered (without and with regime-
specific parameters), the income elasticity is positive for the medium income class and also not
statistically different from 1 in the regime-specific specification. The same kind of results are
obtained with the number of taxpayer models, even though the elasticity estimate is not
statistically significant in the no regime-specific parameter specification. Since the elasticities are
roughly the same between the two models (income and number of taxpayers) we can conclude
that following a tax rate change, most of the effect is due to taxpayers moving to other income
classes. In the case of the medium income class, the positive elasticities indicate that this income
class plays the role of a tax refuge when tax rates increase, presumably because high and perhaps
also highest income taxpayers alter their income in a way that allow them to reach lower income
and marginal tax rate brackets.
                                                          
5
 Even without fiscal regime-specific parameters, elasticities may be computed for each fiscal regime since  tax rates
differ across regimes.
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The case of high income taxpayers is drastically different. Elasticity estimates for this income
class range between –1.41 and –0.67, all of them statistically different from 0. Furthermore, none
of the elasticity estimates for this income class is statistically different from –1. Also here, very
similar magnitudes are observed between the income and number of taxpayer models. These
results clearly show that high income taxpayers respond to tax changes by moving other income
classes. In addition, the importance of the response is such that a tax rate increase, for instance,
leads to a decrease income to a point which completely offset the effect of the tax rate increase in
terms of additional revenues for the government.
Not surprisingly, similar but larger responses are obtained in the highest income class. Again
here, all elasticity estimates are significant and negative, regardless of the specification and
model considered. Furthermore, these elasticities are not different from –1 in the case of the no
regime-specific parameter specifications but are significantly inferior to –1 in the regime-specific
parameter specifications. Their range is from –3.05 to –1.08. The most striking results are
obtained with the regime-specific parameter specification. In that case, we obtained an income
elasticity of –3.0526 and a number of taxpayer elasticity of –1.9351. However, these two
elasticities are not statistically different from each other. Therefore, the conclusion here is that
taxpayers responded to tax changes such that any tax rate increase was followed by a more than
proportional reduction of income leading to reduced government revenues. As it was the case for
high income taxpayers, highest income taxpayers responded mostly by moving to a lower income
class.
Our results are conservative in the sense that they do not consider the response of taxpayers
through the use of fiscal preferences since our analysis is conducted with total income rather than
taxable income. If taxpayers also responded through fiscal preferences (for instance by seeking
remuneration in the form of capital gains rather wages) the effect on government revenues may
have been even more important (see Feldstein, 1999 on induced changes in deductions and
exclusions). In addition, our estimates do not consider the effect of personal income tax rate
changes on the spending behaviour of the taxpayers and therefore on government revenues form
other sources such as the sale tax. These additional effects may have been also quite significant.
Notwithstanding these additional important effects, our results show that federal and provincial
governments in Canada could have raised more revenues during the 1988-1996 period by
decreasing the marginal income tax rates of the high and highest income taxpayers.
5. Conclusion
Our results show that the methodology put forward in this paper can be used to answer this
question: what is the impact of changes in personal income tax rates on the tax base and therefore
on government revenues? Our results also show that in some cases, a reduction in the marginal
tax rates will increase taxable revenues. Given this finding, it is important that the federal
government and the provincial ones take into account that they can both increase revenues and
thus spending and reduce taxes if they choose the proper reductions. It is thus particularly
encouraging that in the October 18th 2000 special budget, the Canadian federal government
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reduced tax rates for high income taxpayers by abolishing the 5% income tax surtax.
Unfortunately, the statutory top marginal rate remains unchanged at 29%. Indeed and ironically
considering our results, the creation of a fourth brackets for the $100,000 and more income
taxpayers means that the two groups identified in this study as the appropriate targets for tax
generating tax cut (TGTC) still face the same statutory rate.
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Table 1 Parameter Estimates of the Total Income Share Models
(White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses)
Without regime effects With regime effectsVariable High Income Highest Income High Income Highest Income
Intercept 0.6633 -1.2838 1.1636 -5.6736
(1.6063) (1.4459) (4.8552) (5.6208)
GDP growth -0.2793 -0.1269 -0.2071 -0.0857
(0.1809) (0.2310) (0.1749) (0.2326)
Unemp. Growth -0.0331 0.0797** -0.0267 0.0743***
(0.0433) (0.0371) (0.0386) (0.0417)
Gini 0.9517 1.6274*** 0.9511 1.4169
(0.6349) (0.8637) (0.6118) (0.8750)
jτ -19.8490* -14.2580* - -
(5.5529) (4.2102)
( jτ )2 18.7565* 11.8748* - -
(5.5877) (3.8169)
jτ  (72-77) - - 2.9825 20.2389
(13.2848) (19.1228)
( jτ )2 (72-77) - -
-3.4969 -14.4409
(13.7725) (15.1285)
jτ  (78-87) - - -22.5063** -34.0467**
(9.8071) (13.6872)
( jτ )2 (78-87) - - 21.6055** 28.7790**
(9.6368) (12.1633)
jτ  (88-96) - - -22.6823 -13.9921
(17.5361) (21.2468)
( jτ )2 (88-96) - - 20.1618 7.8927
(17.9614) (21.3377)
1τ
-11.9604** -
(5.4825)
( 1τ )2 14.9823** -
(6.4687)
1τ  (72-77) - 21.5664
(16.1284)
( 1τ )2 (72-77) - -28.1919
(20.4523)
1τ  (78-87) - -9.2330
(12.6364)
( 1τ )2 (78-87) - 11.7212
(14.5679)
1τ  (88-96) -
-25.2446
(19.9134)
( 1τ )2 (88-96) - 32.1838
(22.7224)
jρ 0.2909 0.5713 0.2245 0.4820
R2 0.986 0.958 0.987 0.956
Log-likelihood 442.478 454.196
Province and time specific effects are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.
*, ** and *** denote respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level.
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Table 2 Parameter Estimates of the Number of Taxpayer Share Models
(White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses)
Without regime effects With regime effectsVariable High Income Highest Income High Income Highest Income
Intercept -0.7516 -4.5531* -0.4697 -4.7678
(1.8461) (1.4802) (4.7672) (5.7047)
GDP growth -0.2065 -0.1751 -0.1238 -0.1289
(0.1893) (0.2731) (0.1822) (0.2681)
Unemp. Growth -0.0156 0.0721*** -0.0072 0.0650
(0.0455) (0.0383) (0.0406) (0.0433)
Gini 0.8258 1.9393** 0.8163 1.7168***
(0.6842) (0.9098) (0.6497) (0.9453)
jτ -19.5943* -10.7618* - -
(6.9195) (4.1113)
( jτ )2 18.3619* 8.6205** - -
(6.9697) (3.7223)
jτ  (72-77) - - 2.4260 7.9256
(12.7447) (18.7519)
( jτ )2 (72-77) - -
-3.0347 -5.1864
(13.1941) (14.8689)
jτ  (78-87) - - -20.3831*** -20.0297
(11.9291) (13.3558)
( jτ )2 (78-87) - - 19.1262 15.8814
(11.8559) (12.0340)
jτ  (88-96) - - -21.1635 -12.9750
(19.1120) (19.8087)
( jτ )2 (88-96) - - 18.5549 9.1220
(19.4593) (19.9558)
1τ
-14.4153* -
(5.5276)
( 1τ )2 17.7579* -
(6.5245)
1τ  (72-77) - 16.8164
(16.4074)
( 1τ )2 (72-77) - -22.5914
(20.8438)
1τ  (78-87) - -9.6385
(12.0299)
( 1τ )2 (78-87) - 11.9411
(13.8285)
1τ  (88-96) -
-24.7976
(21.0147)
( 1τ )2 (88-96) - 32.0998
(23.9814)
jρ 0.2575 0.4766 0.1925 0.3911
R2 0.988 0.973 0.989 0.971
Log-likelihood 419.341 432.217
Province and time specific effects are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.
*, ** and *** denote respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level.
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Table 3 Total Income Elasticity Estimates1
(White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses)
Income class 1972-1996 1972-1977 1978-1987 1988-1996
Medium 0.1672 -0.0437 0.1041  0.3934***
($50,000-$100,000) (0.2150) (0.2420) (0.2199) (0.2230)
High -0.6204* -0.6936* -0.5329* -0.6669*
($100,000-$150,000) (0.2030) (0.2024) (0.2071) (0.2023)
Highest -0.6041*** 0.2443 -0.4435 -1.2071*
($150,000 and more) (0.3104) (0.4722) (0.3284) (0.3328)
1- Entries report elasticity estimates computed at the average marginal tax rate of the period.
 * , ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% confidence level.
Table 4 Number of Taxpayer Elasticity Estimates1
(White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses)
Income class 1972-1996 1972-1977 1978-1987 1988-1996
Medium 0.0995 -0.1464 0.0259 0.3635
($50,000-$100,000) (0.2201) (0.2463) (0.2248) (0.2279)
High -0.6880* -0.7591* -0.6033* -0.7331*
($100,000-$150,000) (0.2208) (0.2205) (0.2262) (0.2202)
Highest  -0.6666** -0.0764 -0.5554*** -1.0813*
($150,000 and more) (0.2924) (0.4541) (0.3093) (0.3194)
1- Entries report elasticity estimates computed at the average marginal tax rate of the period.
 * , **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level.
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Table 5 Total Income Elasticity Estimates (regime specific parameters) 1
(White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses)
Income class 1972-1977 1978-1987 1988-1996
Medium -0.2892 0.1321 1.0375**
($50,000-$100,000) (0.3686) (0.4792) (0.4879)
High -0.2236 -0.4348 -1.3805*
($100,000-$150,000) (0.3249) (0.4448) (0.4140)
Highest 1.4922*** -0.7866 -3.0526*
($150,000 and more) (0.8024) (0.8369) (0.6741)
1. Entries report elasticity estimates computed at the average marginal tax rate of
the period. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1% , 5% and 10%
confidence level.
Table 6 Number of Taxpayer Elasticity Estimates (regime specific parameters) 1
(White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses)
Income class 1972-1977 1978-1987 1988-1996
Medium -0.4159 0.0398 1.1985**
($50,000-$100,000) (0.3839) (0.4576) (0.4855)
High -0.2739 -0.6150 -1.4130*
($100,000-$150000) (0.3368) (0.4395) (0.4088)
Highest 0.9412 -1.1385 -1.9351*
($150,000 and more) (0.7980) (0.7024) (0.5072)
 1- Entries report elasticity estimates computed at the average marginal tax rate of
the period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
confidence level.
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